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APPORTIONING MARITIME COLLISION
DAMAGES: APPLYING THE RULE OF RELIABLE
TRANSFER
The American rule of divided damages in admiralty collision cases
had been applied for 120 years' until it was reconsidered by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.2 Prior to that
decision, admiralty courts had been obliged to aggregate damages
and divide them equally upon finding mutual fault by vessels in a
collision.3 In 1975, the Reliable Transfer Court rejected the tradi-
tional equal division of damages rule' and established a proportional
I The Supreme Court in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
434 (1854), determined that where both parties were at fault in a maritime collision,
each was to bear one-half of all damages. Id. at 439. See The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 51, 56 (1873). The divided damages rule became a well-entrenched rule of
American admiralty law. See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT §§ 9.2-
9.6 (2d ed. 1969); J. GmFFIN, THE AMFucAN LAW OF COLsION § 245 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as GRIFFIN].
2 421 U.S. 397 (1975). The Reliable Transfer Company, as owner of the tanker
Mary A. Whalen, sued the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 741-60 (1970), and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). In Decem-
ber, 1968, the Whalen grounded on a sand bar outside New York harbor. 421 U.S. at
398-99. However, the navigational light ordinarily marking the breakwater was inoper-
ative despite the Coast Guard's obligation to maintain it. 421 U.S. at 399. In an
unreported decision, the district court found that the Coast Guard was 25% at fault
in failing to maintain the breakwater light, while the vessel was 75% at fault for turning
when the captain was uncertain of his position and "made use of nothing except his
guesswork judgment." 421 U.S. at 399. Nevertheless, the district court held that each
party was required to pay one-half of each vessel's total damages under the established
rule of divided damages. See note 3 infra. The court of appeals affirmed. Reliable
Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether a proportional fault rule should replace the
divided damages rule. See Goschka, Goodbye to All That!-The Unlamented Demise
of the Divided Damages Rule, 8 J. MAmuT L. & COM. 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Goschka]; 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 202 (1975).
Divided damages are computed by aggregating the loss or damage to both vessels
and dividing the damages equally between the two vessels, irrespective of the degrees
of their fault. Where three or more vessels were at fault, equal division of damages also
was appropriate among those vessels. The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U.S. 466 (1909), See
The Socony No. 123, 78 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1935). Where one party was solely at fault,
however, that party would bear its own loss as well as the loss of the other vessel. The
Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880).
4 421 U.S. at 410. Justification for the divided damages rule included alleviation
of the inequitable common law rule of contributory negligence which required each
party to pay its own damages. In addition, the Supreme Court in The Schooner Ca-
tharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 434, 439 (1854), stated that the divided dam-
ages rule induced navigational care. The reasons that originally led to the adoption of
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fault rule consistent with that observed by virtually every other major
maritime nation.' The Court held that two or more parties at fault
in a collision or stranding' are liable for property damages proportion-
ately to the extent of their comparative degrees of fault.7 In so hold-
the divided damages rule became "eroded," but the rule continued to exist "by sheer
inertia rather than by reason of any intrinsic merit." 421 U.S. at 410. The rule pre-
vailed for two reasons: "first, judicial disaffection with contributory negligence and,
second, the experience of the courts with the rule had shown it was easy to apply."
Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975). Thus, the divided damages rule was aptly described as a midway point between
a common law contributory negligence rule and a pure comparative negligence rule.
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 333, 341 (1932).
421 U.S. at 403-04. Nearly every maritime nation has ratified or effectively
adopted the Brussels Convention on Collision Liability of 1910. Article 4 of the Conven-
tion provides for proportional damages determined by degree of fault. For an English
translation of the Convention, see 6 KNAUTH's BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 39 (7th ed. A.
Knauth & C. Knauth 1969). See also Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Colli-
sions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 531 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Huger]; Note, The
Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Convention to
Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE
L.J. 878, 890 (1955).
1 A stranding may be defined as "[t]he drifting, driving, or running aground of
a ship on a shore or strand." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1590 (4th rev. ed. 1968). Colli-
sion, on the other hand, is the act of vessels striking together. In its strict sense,
collision means the impact of two moving vessels. Id. at 330. Collision, in its broad
sense, includes allision, the striking of a moving vessel against one that is stationary,
and other types of "encounters between vessels, or a vessel and other floating, though
non-navigable, objects." Id. While the Brussels Convention presumably applies only
to maritime collisions, the Reliable Transfer rule applies to both collisions and strand-
ings. Comment, Comparative Negligence Sails in the High Seas: Have the Recovery
Rights of Cargo Owners Been Jeopardized? 7 CALIF. W. INT'L. L.J. 179, 179 n.3 (1977).
The divided damages rule was applied to groundings and strandings, White Oak
Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Code & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922), and colli-
sions by vessels with fixed objects. Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874).
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. The S.S. Lompoc, 291 F. Supp. 767 (N. D. Cal. 1968)
(damages divided where a submerged pipeline, not buried five feet beneath the river
bottom as required by statute, was damaged by a ship's anchor). Because ships some-
times collide with piers, wharves, bridges, pilings and other shore structures, Congress
extended admiralty jurisdiction in 1948 to all injuries "caused by a vessel. . . notwith-
standing that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46 U.S.C. §
740 (1970).
1 421 U.S. at 411. The Reliable Transfer Court recognized the frequent harshness
of the divided damages rule. The contrast in potential recovery under the divided
damages rule and the proportional fault rule was significant. For example, where vessel
A was 75% at fault having suffered $300,000 in damages and vessel B was 25% at fault
and suffered $100,000 in damages, vessel B would be required to pay $100,000 to vessel
A in addition to suffering its own $100,000 in damages under the divided damages rule.
See note 3 supra. Under the proportional fault rule, however, no damages would change
hands because the percentages of fault and damage suffered in comparison to total
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ing, the Reliable Transfer decision eliminated the disparity between
American use of the divided damages rule and application of the
Brussels Convention proportional fault rule which had encouraged
international forum shopping." Nevertheless, the practical problems
in administering the proportional fault rule must be resolved by ad-
miralty courts with specific regard to remaining peculiarities of
American admiralty law.
In Reliable Transfer, the Supreme Court recognized that gross
inequities often were occasioned by application of the divided dam-
ages rule despite the development of several exceptions to the rule.
By requiring the two parties to pay one-half of the total damages to
both vessels, the rule of divided damages achieved just results only
when both vessels were equally at fault or degrees of fault could not
reasonably be determined.9 In all other cases, the Reliable Transfer
Court indicated that the results were presumably unfair to the party
less at fault.'" In view of the acknowledged inequities of the rule, the
Court explained that historical justifications for divided damages had
been eroded; the rule was no longer necessary to induce navigational
care and to alleviate the inequity of the common law rule of contribu-
tory negligence requiring each party to bear its own damages."
The Reliable Transfer Court further noted that certain legal pre-
sumptions which had been developed to complement the rule of div-
ided damages often precipitated unfair judgments through misappli-
cation or lack of uniform application.'2 The doctrine of error in
extremis'3 and the "major-minor" fault rule'4 recognized that under
certain circumstances the equal division of damages was unjust.
These presumptions,' 5 however, only minimized the inequities of the
damages are equal. Nevertheless, the proportional fault rule is inapplicable where one
vessel is solely at fault. Cliff, Jr., Inc. v. M. V. Captain Will, 526 F.2d 345, reh. denied,
529 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1976) (rehearing denied because finding of sole fault precluded
application of proportional fault rule).
421 U.S. at 403-04. Generally, vessels at greater fault would seek a United States
forum so that they would be liable for a maximum of only one-half of the aggregate
damages. See note 3 supra; Huger, supra note 5, at 531; Franck, Collisions at Sea in
Relation to International Maritime Law, 12 L.Q. REv. 260, 261-63 (1896).
1 421 U.S. at 405. See, e.g., National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 183 F.2d
405 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
" 421 U.S. at 405.
" See note 4 supra.
'z 421 U.S. at 405-06.
13 See text accompanying notes 51-59 infra.
"1 See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra.
Is A presumption is an assumption of one fact which the law requires the trier of
fact to make because of the existence of another fact. The assumption is compelled
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divided damages rule. In addition, the Pennsylvania rule" served to
relieve a party of sole liability for a collision by inculpating a vessel
that had violated a navigational statute. Three other principles,
"inscrutable fault,"' 7 "inevitable accident,' 8 and "last clear
chance,"'" aided courts in determining whether application of the
divided damages rule was appropriate. While the Reliable Transfer
Court criticized application of the major-minor fault rule and the
Pennsylvania rule in the divided damages context, the Court did not
consider the prospective use of these and similar presumptions under
the new proportional fault rule. Admiralty courts now must ascertain
whether these presumptions and principles are applicable under com-
parative fault theory and develop suitable methods for computing
degrees of fault between parties to a collision.
The Reliable Transfer Court also left for future examination by
admiralty courts the effect of the comparative fault rule on cargo
interests." Despite establishing a proportional fault rule to which
most major maritime nations adhere, United States admiralty courts
continue to apply the principle of joint and several liability among
vessels at fault to allow full recovery by innocent cargo owners from
non-carrying vessels.2 Non-carriers, in turn, may seek equal contri-
bution from carriers at fault. International maritime collision law,
however, permits innocent cargo owners to obtain proportional recov-
ery from each vessel according to its fault and without provision for
carrier contribution.22 Therefore, international choice of forum re-
mains an important factor for cargo interests seeking to litigate inno-
because human experience justifies it on logical grounds, because it is. a procedural
convenience, or because it furthers a result deemed socially desirable. Morgan, Some
Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. RPv. 906 (1931). However, one
commentator has noted that "presumption" has been used in eight different senses by
the courts. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L.
Rzv. 195, 196-207 (1953). The major-minor fault "rule", see text accompanying notes
24-30 infra, is not really a rule, but a presumption. California v. The Italian M.S. Ilice,
534 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1976); 35 MD. L. REv. 714, 720 (1976). In addition, the
Pennsylvania "rule", see text accompanying notes 31-50 infra, and the "rule" of error
in extremis, see text accompanying notes 51-59 infra, are more accurately described
as presumptions.
" See text accompanying notes 31-50 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
" See text accompanying note 99 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 90-95 infra.
'o No cargo claims were involved in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397 (1975).
11 See text accompanying notes 134-45 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 134-51 infra.
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cent cargo loss.?
Three presumptions were developed in American admiralty law to
complement the rule of divided damages. The major-minor fault rule
was applied where a collision was caused by the gross and inexcusable
fault of one vessel while the fault of the other vessel was merely
technical and did not contribute significantly to the cause of the
collision.2 4 Where one vessel was grossly negligent, courts tended to
resolve all doubts in favor of the comparatively innocent vessel by
finding non-contributing fault or disregarding slight fault. 6 In such
cases, the vessel guilty of gross error was held liable for the entire loss
to both vessels." Only clear proof of substantial contributing fault
could rebut the presumption in favor of the more innocent vessel.
2
1
Unfortunately, uniform application of the rule was precluded by the
vagueness of admiralty court guidelines 9 for its use, thereby render-
ing the rule unreliable.2 0
2 Id.
11 The rule was enunciated in The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893):
Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontradicted
testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account for the
disaster, it is not enough for such vessel to raise a doubt with regard
to the management of the other vessel. There is some presumption at
least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable doubt with regard to the
propriety of the conduct of such other vessel should be resolved in its
favor.
Upon establishing that one vessel was grossly at fault, the major-minor fault rule
created an evidentiary problem of sufficiency of proof. Damages would not be divided
without proof of the other vessel's substantial contributing fault. See The Victory &
The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897); Compania de Maderas de Caibarien v. The
Queenston Heights, 220 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1955). The major-minor fault rule was
properly applied as an evidentiary presumption under the divided damages rule. See
35 MD. L. Rsv. 714, 720 (1976).
2 See, e.g., The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 204 (1895); The Cornell 15 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1926).
z, See, e.g., The Great Republic, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20, 35 (1875); Theothilatos v.
Martin Marine Transp. Co., 127 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1942). See generally GIFFIN, supra
note 1, at § 224.
2 See, e.g., The Victory & The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897).
The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 197 (1895). Where one vessel is clearly at fault, "it
is not unreasonable to require that she should make the fault of the other equally
clear." Id. at 204.
21 Although the major-minor fault rule was clearly stated in The City of New York,
see note 24 supra, the term "minor" is susceptible of varying definitions; application
of the term is contingent upon each court's judgment as to the range of degrees of fault
which might appropriately be termed "minor."
Compare Compania de Maderas de Caibarien v. The Queenston Heights, 220
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1955) with The Atlas, 93 U-S. 302 (1876); Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co.
v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1953); and National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United
1977l
1242 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
Another presumption, the rule of The Pennsylvania,3' frequently
was employed in determining the liability of parties involved in a
collision." To invoke the Pennsylvania rule, a party first had to estab-
lish that the other party violated a navigational.regulation intended
both to prevent the type of loss actually suffered, and to protect the
party who suffered the loss. 3 3 As a legal consequence of statutory
violation, courts employing the rule inferred that violation of a stat-
ute indicated a disregard for a standard of correct action.34 The
Pennsylvania rule thus functioned as a presumption that violation of
statutes or regulations intended to prevent collisions35 constituted
fault36 by the violator and was prima facie evidence that the violation
contributed to the cause of the mishap .3  The Pennsylvania rule
shifted the burden of proof s concerning the causal relationship from
States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865
(1950). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-4 (2d ed: 1975) [here-
inafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
1, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873). After the collision of the Pennsylvania and the
Mary Troop, the Supreme Court found that the Pennsylvania was more at fault for
operating at an excessive speed in heavy fog. Id. at 133-35. The violation by the Mary
Troop was ringing a bell, which indicated that a vessel was stationary, instead of
sounding a foghorn as required by statute when a vessel was underway. Id. at 135-36.
The Mary Troop, nevertheless, was held liable for one-half of the total damages. See
generally Zapf, The Growth of the Pennsylvania Rule: A Study of Causation in Mari-
time Law, 7 J. MAmT. L. & CoM. 521 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zapfl.
11 The Pennsylvania rule also was applied in cases involving collisions between
vessels and stationary objects. See, e.g., Complaint of Wasson, 495 F.2d 571, 580 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). See note 6 supra.
Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New Course for an Ancient Mariner,
54 BOSTON U.L. REv. 78, 79 (1974). Fault on the part of a vessel involved in a collision
also may result from failure to exercise due care without, in fact, violating any naviga-
tional statutes. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 7-5.
31 The concept of "fault" presupposes a standard of correct action. Navigational
rules codify this standard. Id. at § 7-4. See note 35 infra.
3 Most cases invoking the Pennsylvania rule have concerned violations of one of
four sets of statutory navigational rules: International Rules of Navigation, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-94 (1970); the Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1970); the Western
Rivers Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1970); and the Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232
(1970). See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at §§ 7-3 and 7-7 through 7-13. Other
statutes have also been held to come within the ambit of the Pennsylvania rule. These
include federal, state, and local enactments, as well as proven customs and regulations
not inconsistent with the Rules of Navigation. Id. at §§ 7-3, 7-13.
36 "Fault" is a conclusion that there is legal significance to the physical event of
collision. See The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189, 198-99 (1872); GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 30, at §§ 7-2 to 7-4 (2d ed. 1975).
11 35 MD. L. REv. 714, 721 (1976). See GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at § 25.
" The term "burden of proof" is ambivalent because it includes two separate
burdens of proof: the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact in issue and
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the party seeking to impose liability for negligence to the statutory
violator. The rule required the vessel in statutory violation to show
beyond all reasonable doubt that the violation could not have caused
the collision. 9 Thus, the presumption was rebuttable only by proof
that a violation was not just unlikely to have been a cause of the
collision, but rather, that it could not have caused the collision."
When this burden Was not discharged, both vessels were deemed at
fault and were liable for equally divided damages.4 Therefore, both
the preliminary presumption of fault occasioned by a regulatory vio-
lation and the presumption of causation4 2 were significant to the ulti-
mate effect of establishing mutual fault in collisions under the
Pennsylvania rule.
While the Pennsylvania rule was designed to promote diligent
observance of navigational rules, 3 it also punished harshly violators
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. C. McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. E. Cleary, 1972); J. THAYER, A
PRELiNARY.TREATISE ON EvDENCE Ch. 9 (1898). While much disagreement exists
among commentators, some have stated that the violator must meet both burdens.
E.g., Zapf, supra note 31, at 525; Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New Course
for an Ancient Mariner, 54 BOSTON U.L. REv. 78, 80 (1974). See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 30, at § 7-5, 404. Other commentators argue that the only effect of the
Pennsylvania rule's presumption is to subject the violator to the burden of going
forward with evidence to overcome the inference that the violation was a contributing
cause of the collision. E.g., GmRFIN, supra note 1, at § 25. See The Aakre, 122 F.2d
469, 474 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1941) (mere production of evidence
sufficient, leaving burden on plaintiff to prove proximate cause).
31 The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) at 136. A number of cases suggested a
modification of the harsh Pennsylvania rule, providing that a ship seeking to escape
the rule need not show that its fault could not "by any stretch of the imagination,"
have contributed causally to the accident. China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A.O. Anderson
& Co., 364 F.2d 769, 782 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 933 (1967). Accord,
Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi AB/Disa, 213 F.2d 772, 775 (1st Cir. 1954). The
Fourth Circuit has circumvented the rule by utilizing such tort doctrines as "passive
action" and "last clear chance". See, e.g., Tempest v. United States, 404 F.2d 870,
872 (4th Cir. 1968); text accompanying notes 90-95 infra. In addition, many circuits
have been reluctant to find the burden unsatisfied when the non-violator's fault has
been gross, indicating an unwillingness to apply the divided damages rule. See
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 7-5; text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
" The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873). The word "could" may
have been employed regrettably in the rule's requirement that the statutory violation
could not have caused the collision since a violation almost always could have "some"
possible, albeit remote, relation to the accident. GRIFnN, supra note 1, at § 201.
11 See, e.g., The Martello, 153 U.S. 64 (1894); Richelieu & Ont. Navig. Co. v.
Boston Marine Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 408 (1890).
11 The Pennsylvania rule is usually referred to as a presumption of causation. See,
e.g., Zapf, supra note 31, at 521. But see text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
11 See, e.g., GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 7-5.
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involved in a collision. Application of the rule to minor infractions of
navigational rules often resulted in equal liability under the divided
damages rule." The Pennsylvania rule promoted safety by requiring
strict adherence to navigational statutes, 5 but also penalized statu-
tory violators with an extreme burden of proof."
In some cases, the practical effect of the Pennsylvania rule was
related to the major-minor fault rule. After a collision, a vessel that
had violated a statute could try to exculpate itself from liability
under the major-minor fault rule.47 In seeking to overcome the strong
Pennsylvania rule's presumption of contributing fault, a party may
have argued that fault occasioned by statutory violation could not
have been a contributing cause of the collision where the other vessel
had been grossly at fault. In a limited number of cases, the party
proven to have been a statutory violator had been able to discharge
the heavy Pennsylvania burden of proof of causation by showing that
the loss would have occurred regardless of its violation. 9 Thus, the
major-minor fault rule could serve to ameliorate strict application of
the Pennsylvania rule.5
In addition to the Pennsylvania rule and the major-minor fault
rule, federal courts employed the error in extremis rule to avoid divi-
sion of damages where a vessel had been threatened with imminent
peril through no fault of its own.' Any fault attributable to the en-
11 See note 40 supra.
15 See Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New Course for an Ancient
Mariner, 54 BOSTON U.L. REv. 78, 81 (1974).
46 The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604
(1933).
11 The major-minor fault rule is restricted in scope by the Pennsylvania rule,
which requires strict adherence to Rules of Navigation, see note 36 supra, and prevents
courts from easily discounting the seriousness of any violation. See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 30, at § 7-5.
Is The major-minor fault rule encompasses both statutory fault and fault caused
by lack of due care. Where a party's allegedly minor fault was statutory, that party
might request the court to apply the major-minor fault rule.
", See, e.g., Compania de Maderas de Caibarien v. The Queenston Heights, 220
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1955); Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi AB/Disa, 213 F.2d 772
(ltt Cir. 1954).
'o GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 7-5; 35 MD. L. REv. 714, 723 (1976). The
practical operation of the Pennsylvania rule, insofar as it elicited proof rebutting its
presumptions, was correlated to the major-minor fault rule. However, some cases
indicate that application of the major-minor fault rule was limited to cases involving
violations of ordinary duties rather than breaches of statutory requirements. See, e.g.,
Diesel Tanker F. A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1965);
O/Y Finlayson-Forssa A/B v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 259 F.2d 11, 22 (5th Cir. 1958).
3' The general principle was stated in The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12
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dangered vessel, whether a statutory violation or breach of a naviga-
tional standard of care, was presumed not'to have contributed to the
collision because of exigent circumstances.2 The rule was based on
the inference that a gravely threatened vessel could not always be
expected to exercise due care. 3 However, the rule of error in extremis
could be invoked only after demonstrating that the vessel taking
evasive action could not have contributed to the danger which gave
rise to the collision. 4 Furthermore, the error must have been made
upon confrontation of a complex crisis by the navigator, precluding
an opportunity to exercise proper judgment. 5 Finally, the error must
have been due, not to the gross negligence or incompetence of the
navigator, but to the sudden peril that prevented correct action.,
Under the error in extremis rule, fault normally attributable to a
statutory violation might be vitiated by the emergency of a seemingly
unavoidable collision because a finding of negligence would require
that reasonable opportunity for a decision and the exercise of due care
existed.57 Therefore, application of the rule of error in extremis acted
partially to rebut the presumption of contributing fault under the
Pennsylvania rule. When danger of a probable collision was precipi-
tated by the gross fault of another vessel, the error in extremis rule
provided that an honest error in judgment was not to be imputed as
fault to the vessel placed in grave danger. Thus, the rule excusing
error in extremis may be regarded as one manifestation of the major-
minor fault rule: 9 the fault of the vessel causing the calamity was
found to eclipse the fault of the other vessel seeking to escape the
danger.
How.) 233, 245 (1852). See Wilson v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 276 U.S. 454 (1928); The
Nacoochee, 137 U.S. 330, 340 (1890).
52 See GiuFFIN, supra note 1, at § 233.
3 Id.
31 See, e.g., The Elizabeth Jones, 112 U.S. 514, 523 (1884); The Paris, 37 F.2d 734
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd mem., 44 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 833 (1930).
u If the decision by the endangered vessel'was a difficult and doubtful one, much
greater leniency was granted to that vessel. GmmRN, supra note 1, at § 235. However,
where the obvious alternative to a collision was to reverse the engines, failure to do so
many have constituted fault. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.
1934).
" When substantial time preceding a collision was sufficient to permit proper
action, a wrong maneuver was not an error in extremis. See, e.g., A.H. Bull S.S. Co.
v. United States, 34 F.2d 614, 616 (2d Cir. 1929); The Lake Calvenia, 2 F.2d 416, 417
(4th Cir. 1924).
57 GIus'nN, supra note 1, at § 233.
" See, e.g., Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); The Maggie J. Smith, 123 U.S.
349 (1887).
5, GRUFFIN, supra note 1, at § 224, 505.
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While the Pennsylvania rule, the major-minor fault rule and the
error in extremis rule all had well-reasoned bases and provided sound
justification for modifying the divided damages rule, the Reliable
Transfer decision and the proportional fault rule have undermined
their continuing validity. However, the specific holding of Reliable
Transfer in abrogating the divided damages rule did not directly
abolish any of these rules."' Whether the nature of proportional dam-
ages will allow the use of the rules even as permissible evidentiary
inferences depends on their utility in establishing the existence and
degrees of fault."'
The Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer implied that resort to the
major-minor fault rule was no longer necessary.2 Comparatively in-
significant negligence by a vessel which was previously ignored under
the major-minor fault rule might now subject that same vessel to
some proportion of liability. 3 Thus, in Getty Oil Co. v. S. S. Ponce
De Leon, 4 the Second Circuit held that slight fault should not be
overlooked by application of the Reliable Transfer rule, and that
precedents which invoked the major-minor fault rule were no longer
consistent with the purposes of the proportional fault rule. 5 Because
a vessel now pays its proportional share of damages, however small,
justification no longer exists for courts to disregard slight fault where
the fault is causally linked to the mishap.66 In addition, one district
court in Harris v. Newman 7 implied that the major-minor fault rule
" See 421 U.S. at 410-11.
A "presumption" and an "inference" are not synonymous. A presumption is a
deduction that the law requires a trier of fact to make, while an inference is a deduction
the trier may or may not make, according to his own conclusions. Thus, a presumption
is mandatory; an inference is permissible. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 917-18 (4th rev. ed.
1968). See note 15 supra.
2 See 421 U.S. at 406-07. The Reliable Transfer Court implied that the major-
minor fault rule is too "crude" for further use. Id. at 407. The Court stated: "[tihis
escape valve ... simply replaced one unfairness with another. That a vessel is primar-
ily negligent does not justify its shouldering all responsibility, nor excuse the slightly
negligent vessel from bearing any liability at all." Id. at 406. See Goschka, supra note
2, at 66; 35 MD. L. REv. 714, 723 (1976); 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 202 (1975).
1 Linehan v. United States Lines, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 678, 689 n.17 (D. Del. 1976);
Getty Oil Co. v. S.S. Ponce De Leon, 409 F. Supp. 909, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); afl'd,.
555 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1977).
', 555 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g, 409 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
555 F.2d at 335.
" One circuit has suggested that the major-minor fault rule is, in effect, a rebutta-
ble presumption that the minor fault was not a cause of the collision. California v. The
Italian M.S. Ilice, 534 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1976). But see text accompanying notes
24-30 supra.
11 404 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
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was not a necessary aid in finding that the gross negligence of one
vessel was the sole and proximate cause of the collision." However,
the Ninth Circuit in California v. The Italian M. S. Ilicell has sug-
gested that the rule may help to establish whether the "major" party
has been the exclusive cause of the collision and is solely at fault, or
whether the "minor" party has been one of the proximate causes of
the collision and should be held to some degree of liability.71 There-
fore, the major-minor fault rule should not be applied to discount the
contributing fault of a vessel under Reliable Transfer. Nevertheless,
the rule may be employed by admiralty courts as an evidentiary
inference with respect to the preliminary question of whether the
comparatively insignificant fault contributed causally to the colli-
sion.
Because the Reliable Transfer Court did not expressly abolish the
Pennsylvania rule, 71 a number of courts have assumed that it is still
applicable and suitable for encouraging compliance with navigational
statutes.71 While the Supreme Court in The Pennsylvania intended
to promote more diligent observance of statutes,73 the practical effect
of the rule in determining causation and fault under divided damages
principles ultimately dictated the allocation of liability between par-
ties.74 Because of the manner in which the proportional fault rule
'0 Id. at 952-53. The Harris court may have blurred the distinction between sole
fault and major-minor fault. The court applied the rule of The City of New York, 147
U.S. 72, 85 (1893), which stated the major-minor fault rule, see note 24 supra, to
conclude that one vessel did nothing that actively contributed to the collision. 404 F.
Supp. at 952-53. At the same time, the Harris court stated that discussion of the major-
minor fault rule was unnecessary because one vessel was the sole and proximate cause
of the collision. Id. at 953.
" 534 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1976).
70 Id. at 840. The suggestion has been made that the major-minor fault rule may
be helpful for determining both the existence and degree of fault. 21 LoYoLA L. Rv.
790, 792 (1975). However, other commentators have recognized its obsolescence. E.g.,
36 LA. L. REv. 288, 295 (1975); 35 MD. L. Rv. 714, 723-24 (1976); 7 Tax. TECH. L. REv.
113, 118 (1975).
11 See 421 U.S. at 410-11. The Reliable Transfer Court did criticize the
Pennsylvania rule as it related to the divided damages rule. Id. at 405-06. Accord,
Three Rivers Rock Co. v. MiV Martin, 401 F. Supp..15, 18 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (acknowl-
edging continued existence of rule).
72 See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Willamette-Western Corp., 519 F.2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Texaco Panama, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (E.D. La.
1977); Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 952, 959 (E.D. La. 1975).
13 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873) ("Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience
to the mandate of the statute").
71 See text accompanying notes 31-50 supra.
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disposes of the crucial issues of causation and liability, 5 the practical
effect of the Pennsylvania rule in determining causation and fault
need not survive Reliable Transfer."6 Moreover, the Pennsylvania rule
does not necessarily remain unchanged after the Reliable Transfer
decision merely because it promoted the still desirable goal of adher-
ence to regulations.
7
While the Pennsylvania rule may be helpful in determining the
existence and degree of fault in allocating proportional fault,78 the
heavy burden of persuasion which the rule imposes on the statutory
violator may interfere with a court's exercise of judgment. The Ninth
Circuit, in Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 7 declared that utiliza-
tion of the rule in a proportional fault context would complicate
adjudication of collision liability because of difficulty in comparing
the effect of a statutory violation to the non-statutory fault of the
other party." In addition, where both parties have violated safety
statutes, determination of their comparative fault would necessitate
weighing the relative importance of each statute against all others."
Where statutory violations are found to be of equal gravity, applica-
tion of the Pennsylvania rule could compel the very division of dam-
ages which the Reliable Transfer Court disfavored.12
71 See text accompanying notes 105-18 infra. Under the proportional fault rule,
negligence must contribute to the cause of the collision. Id.
76 Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1975) (effect
of rule in disposing of crucial issues of causation and liability renders it akin to sub-
stantive law).
" Adherence to regulations is still a desirable goal because compliance with navi-
gational rules induces navigational care. See note 34 supra.
78 E.g., 21 LoYoLA L. REv. 790, 797 (1975). But see 11 TEx. INT'L L. J. 159, 163
(1976) (stating that the rule is obsolete).
7 510 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1975). See Ninth Circuit Survey-Admiralty-Collision, 6
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 348, 353 (1976).
11 510 F.2d at 880. The Ishizaki court concluded that the applicable Japanese law
had abolished legal presumptions of fault, thereby precluding application of the
Pennsylvania rule, id. at 882-83, and that Japan apportions fault between parties
instead of dividing damages. Id. at 878. At the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Ishizaki, substantive law in the United States still required a division of damages in
collisions involving mutual fault while Japan, as a signatory to the Brussels Conven-
tion, applied a rule of comparative negligence. Id. at 880.
Commentators have noted that "[t]here is not entire consistency in the qualifica-
tion of duties as 'statutory' and 'non-statutory'." GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 30, at
§ 7-5, 497. For example, Rule 29, International Rules of Navigation, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
94 (1970), contains broad language which might be read to mandate "due care". Such
an interpretation would make all negligence "statutory fault."
$I Ninth Circuit Survey-Admiralty-Collision, 6 GOLDN GATE U.L. Rav. 348, 352
(1976).
11 Id. at 352 n.84. Where both parties have violated safety statutes, the
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The rule of error in extremis often was related in practical effect
to both the major-minor fault rule and the Pennsylvania rule., Argu-
ably, the rule no longer should be retained after the Reliable Transfer
decision because it may be illogical to admit that an error has been
committed by a vessel and then .ignore the fault attributable to the
party who has violated a statute or breached a duty of care."' In
addition, the error in extremis presumption suffers from the same
vagueness that plagued the major-minor rule." However, an error by
a vessel avoiding an imminent collision is not necessarily inculpatory
fault, either because the error was the inevitable consequence of the
situation 6 or because the initial negligence was the proximate cause
of the error." Thus, continued-application of the error in extremis rule
could aid in determining the actual existence of fault. While even
slight fault by a vessel contributing to a collision should not be ig-
nored under the proportional fault rule,88 another possible application
Pennsylvania rule might compel divided damages where neither party has discharged
its burden under the rule. Id. Alternatively, admiralty courts might rule that the
burden on each party under the rule cancels the other's burden. The Pennsylvania rule
would not aid the court in either alternative. Id.
The Pennsylvania rule may be viable as a presumption against a party that its
statutory violation contributed to the causation of an accident. See 36 LA. L. REv. 288,
294 (1975). However, the proportional fault rule provides that statutory fault causally
linked to the collision is a factor to be weighed in apportioning degrees of fault. See
text accompanying notes 119-22 infra. Therefore, the Pennsylvania rule, viewed in
this way, is not particularly helpful to the courts. The Pennsylvania presumption may
impose the burden of proof on a vessel to prove that violation of a statute was only
pne contributing cause of a collision rather than its sole cause. 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 202,
213 (1975).
Although the Supreme Court based the Pennsylvania decision partially upon a
similar law in England, the English Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 abolished
statutory presumptions of fault. See 4 R. MARSDEN, BnmsH SHIPPING LAWS, COLISIONS
AT SEA 633 (11th ed. 1961). The effect of the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 was
that each party must prove the allegations which he makes against another, whether
the negligence alleged to have caused damage concerns breach of regulations or breach
of duty. See The Heranger, [1921] Lloyd's List L.R. 375. American courts might
similarly abolish the Pennsylvania rule. See Goschka, supra note 2, at 66; 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 116, 125 (1975).
0 See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
" 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 159, 163 (1976) (in extremis is a relic of the past). See text
accompanying notes 62-66 supra. But see Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative
Negligence, 17 Cornell L.Q. 333, 352 (1932) (application of the error in extremis rule
should be the same under either the proportional fault rule or divided damages rule).
The Supreme Court did not mention the rule of error in extremis in Reliable Transfer.
" GuMso & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 7-3, 491. See note 30 supra.
" 50 TULANE L. REv. 148, 152 n.35 (1975).
" Goschka, supra note 2, at 51. See 13 Hous. L. Rsv. 175, 185 (1975).
M See text accompanying notes 62-70 supra.
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of error in extremis rule might sustain its viability. The rule may be
retained as a permissible inference that the exigent circumstances of
an inevitable collision may diminish to some lesser proportion the
degree of fault attributable to a navigator whose error was the result
of improper judgment in an emergency."
In addition to the three legal presumptions, the major-minor fault
rule, the Pennsylvania rule, and the rule of error in extremis, the
doctrine of last clear chance complemented the rule of divided dam-
ages. The doctrine of last clear chance has been applied selectively"
in admiralty collision cases to relieve a claimant from liability where
the claimant's minimal negligence in creating a dangerous situation
was known to the other party; rather than avoiding collision, the
ensuing negligence of the other party led to the damage." Like the
major-minor fault presumption, the doctrine of last clear chance was
applied in a limited number of cases to require the party whose fault
was gross to shoulder the entire burden of collision damages.12 Be-
cause of disparate application of the doctrine 3 and its similarity to
" The English admiralty courts still apply the rule of error in extremis in a propor-
tional fault context. See, e.g., The Testbank [1941] 70 Lloyd's List L.R. 270, 276,
(Langton, J.); The Court of Appeal varied the proportions of blame to account for the
error. [1942] 72 Lloyd's List L.R. 6.
" The applicability of the last clear chance doctrine in admiralty cases has always
been uncertain. Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466, 470-72 (5th Cir. 1969).
Compare The Perserverance, 63 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 289 U.S. 744
(1933); and The El Monte, 252 F. 59, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1918); with The Norman B. Ream,
252 F. 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1918). Because recovery in maritime collision cases is not
defeated by contributory negligence, admiralty courts have been less willing than other
courts to find that the doctrine of last clear chance applies. GILMORE & BLAcK, supra
note 30, at § 7-5, 494. See GumiN, supra note 1, at § 215 (doctrine not to be applied
unless definite line of cleavage exists between the final fault and prior negligence).
" In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 720 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 944 (1965).
,1 See, e.g., Crawford v. Indian Towing Co., 240 F.2d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957) (damage attributed entirely to gross fault of one vessel);
The Sanday, 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam), (sole liability, minor fault of
tug was immaterial).
"3 See Manhattan Lighterage Corp. v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 274, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). Some courts require that the defendant must actually have been
aware of the danger to have had the last clear chance to avoid the accident while other
courts require only that the defendant should have discovered the chance to avoid the
collision in the exercise of reasonable care. Id. In one line of cases, courts loosely
referred to the doctrine when the earlier negligent act by one party was simply not a
proximate cause of the collision. See Crawford v. Indian Towing Co., 240 F.2d 308, 311
(5th Cir. 1955); The Perseverance, 63 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1933), (fault must be a
"cause", not a "condition" of the collision).
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the now abrogated major-minor fault rule,9 the comparative negli-
gence rule of Reliable Transfer renders the doctrine obsolete.9 5
Two principles, "inscrutable fault" and "inevitable accident,"
were left unexamined by the Reliable Transfer Court although they
traditionally have been employed in collision cases. Inscrutable fault
has been defined as a situation where evidence of the mishap is so
conflicting that it is impossible to determine what direct acts caused
the collision or to specify any particular fault."6 Under such circum-
stances, neither party has discharged its burden of proof,9" and no
negligence can be found. In those rare instances where the doctrine
can be applied, each vessel bears its own damages because the right
to damages is based solely upon negligence causing or contributing
to a collision.9" Liability for fault also is denied in a situation of
inevitable accident, where the collision could not be prevented under
the existing circumstances by the exercise of ordinary care, caution,
and maritime skill by both vessels.99
" E.g., Williamson v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417, 423 (E.D.N.C. 1958). In
Williamson, the court noted that admiralty cases tacitly or expressly recognizing the
last clear chance doctrine might have applied the major-minor fault rule and achieved
the same result. Id. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
,5 36 LA. L. Rav. 288, 295 (1975). However, in S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West
Towing, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 596, 606-07 (S.D. Fla. 1976), the court found that the
doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable to the circumstances of the case, imply-
ing its continuing validity in post-Reliable Transfer cases.
"1 See, e.g., The Jumna, 149 F. 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1906). The Jumna court indicated
that the phrase "inevitable accident" has a comprehensive meaning which includes
inscrutable fault. In early cases of inscrutable fault in the United States the damages
were divided precisely as in cases where both vessels were at fault. E.g., The Worthing-
ton & Davis, 19 F. 836 (E.D. Mich. 1883). At the time of the Jumna decision, a
preponderance of authority held that there could be no recovery absent affirmative
evidence of fault. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
196, 203 (1869).
'7 See The Jumna, 149 F. 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1906); 36 LA. L. Rav. 288, 296 (1975).
" Wilson Marine Transit Co. v. Pennsylvania-Ont. Transp. Co., 191 F. Supp. 210,
219 (N.D. Ohio 1960). ("end result of each party's being required to pay its own loss is
in accord and harmonizes with the Court's concept of justice under the evidence and
law in this case"). The principle of inscrutable fault apparently has fallen into disuse
because modem navigation rules and communication equipment aid courts in estab-
lishing fault on the part of a vessel. See Cities Service Oil Co. v. MN Melvin H. Baker,
260 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Cities Service, counsel were invited to comment
upon the possible application of the inscrutable fault doctrine to the case because of
the significant amount of conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, the court weighed the
uncontradicted facts of record with the assumptions, disputed pre-collision data, and
conclusions of experts on both sides to find one vessel solely at fault. Id. at 246-47.
" See, e.g., The Morning Light, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 550, 560 (1864); Atkins v.
Lorentzen, 328 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1964). See also GU.MoRE & BLACK, supra note 30,
at § 7-2.
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The Reliable Transfer proviso to divide damages when it is impos-
sible to determine fairly the comparative degrees of fault'00 may apply
to cases of inscrutable fault and inevitable accident. However, this
corollary to the proportional fault rule presumably applies to those
situations where there is concurrent but unassessable fault on the
part of both vessels."°" In order to divide damages equally under
Reliable Transfer, negligence by both parties must be presupposed.,"
In contrast, inevitable accident and inscrutable fault characterize
collisions where fault is unattributable to the parties.' 3 In such situa-
tions, no recovery was previously available. Denying any award of
division of damages in the absence of attributable fault, under princi-
ples of inscrutable fault and inevitable accident, does not necessarily
conflict with awards under Reliable Transfer. Therefore, the Reliable
Transfer decision should not be interpreted to require damage recov-
ery, even equally divided damages, in collision cases involving inscru-
table fault and inevitable accident where fault cannot be deter-
mined.""4
While federal courts and commentators are uncertain about the
continuing validity of the Pennsylvania,'°5 major-minor fault,'06 and
error in extremis rules,'10 the courts have exhibited little apparent
difficulty in applying the Reliable Transfer rule to compute the pro-
portions of fault assignable to the respective parties of a collision.',"
'® 421 U.S. at 407. "When it is impossible fairly to allocate degrees of fault, the
division of damages equally between wrongdoing parties is an equitable solution." Id.
101 Id.
"o2 There is a tenuous distinction between concurrent but unassessable negligence
and a finding that fault is unattributable to the parties. 36 LA. L. REv. 288, 296 n.51
(1975).
,o3 See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
"0 See 36 LA. L. REv. 288, 296 n.51 (1975).
,o Compare Three Rivers Rock Co. v. M/V Martin, 401 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D. Mo.
1975) (no collision, but dictum that defendant would not be liable because plaintiff
had not discharged Pennsylvania burden of proof regarding violation of the Wreck Act,
33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970)); and Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 952,
959-60 (E.D. La. 1975) (vessel operating without horn contributed to collision under
Pennsylvania rule); and Alamo Chem. Transp. Co. v. MN Overseas Valdes, 398 F.
Supp. 1094, 1106 (E.D. La. 1975); with Crown Zellerbach Corp, v. Willamette-Western
Corp., 519 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial court's failure to apply the
Pennsylvania rule was not error because statutory violator's negligence had been con-
sidered in apportioning fault among defendants).
'0 See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. S.S. Ponce De Leon, 409 F. Supp. 909, 917 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), a/f'd, 555 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1977) (major-minor rule obsolete). Cf., Harris v.
Newman, 404 F. Supp. 947, 952-53 (S.D. Miss. 1975). (See note 68 supra.)
,o See, e.g., 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 163 (1976); 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 202, 210 (1975).
100 See, e.g., Houston Barge Line, Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, 416 F.
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The proportional fault rule requires that each vessel be liable for
property damage" 9 according to its degree of fault unless the propor-
Supp. 417, 425 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (evidence established that negligence of one pilot was
twice as great in quantity and quality as other pilot); Creole Shipping Ltd. v. Diaman-
dis Pateras Ltd., 410 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (injury to plaintiff's negligently
moored vessel as a result of suction of defendant's vessel negligently operated at exces-
sive speed; fault apportioned two-thirds to defendant, one-third to plaintiff); Seely v.
Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 396 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (owner of tugboat
that collided with unmarked sunken wreck was entitled to damages from wreck owner
less 25% because tugboat captain frequently had seen flashing light on sunken boat
and was negligent in failing to use searchlights to look for wreck).
10 A potential problem in the application of Reliable Transfer was raised by the
Court's use of the term "property damage." Under the divided damages rule, personal
injury awards were included in the total measure of damages to be allocated between
the colliding vessels. Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Testing Co., 552 F.2d 1126, 1134 n.26
(5th Cir. 1977). Thus, the term property damage in the Reliable Transfer holding does
not foreclose application of the proportional fault rule when personal injury awards in
maritime collision cases are at issue. Id. See Winter v. Eon Productions, Ltd., 433 F.
Supp. 742 (E.D. La. 1976).
Liability for "property damage" under Reliable Transfer may encourage courts to
apply the proportional fault rule for recovery of cargo damage or loss in both collision
and non-collision cases. See Vana Trading Skou Co. v. S.S. Mette Skow, 556 F.2d 100
(2d Cir. 1977). In Vana Trading, an admiralty cargo suit for damage to shipment of
yams was brought by the consignee against the time charterer, who impleaded the
vessel owner and stevedore. While the district court allocated damages pursuant to
certain agreements by the parties, the district court noted in dictum that Reliable
Transfer may apply to cargo loss situations. 415 F. Supp. 884, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
However, the Second Circuit refused to apply the doctrine of proportionate fault to the
cargo loss situation on appeal. 556 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1977). The court reasoned that
While the time charterer could prove that damage to the cargo was in part caused by
inadequate packaging, the time charterer was unable to prove the amount of damage
attributable to such packaging. Thus, the Second Circuit found that the time charterer
was liable for the full amount of damages under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970), in accordance with the rule established in Schnell v. The
Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934).
Prior to Reliable Transfer, the Supreme Court declared that it had never expressly
applied the equal division of damage rule in any non-collision case. Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952). However, the Reliable
Transfer decision may answer the previously disputed question of how contribution
between joint tortfeasors will be computed and whether contribution should be allowed
by equal or proportional division of damages. See 7 Tax. TECH. L. REV. 113, 118 n.60
(1975). In Halcyon, the Court held that there could be no contribution between joint
tortfeasors in a non-collision case. However, the party against whom contribution was
sought, the plaintiff's employer, was immune from liability because the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-05 (1970), as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 902-48a (Supp. V. 1975), was interpreted as providing the
plaintiff's only right to compensation. But see Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F.
Supp. 516, 522-23 (E.D. N.Y. 1976).
The Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974),
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tions of fault cannot be ascertained." 0 Courts have recognized that
the comparative measure of fault is mandatory' and that the proviso
for equally divided damages where degrees of fault cannot be isolated
is merely a necessary corollary to the Reliable Transfer rule."
2
apparently limited Halcyon to its facts and allowed contribution between joint tortfea-
sors in a non-collision maritime action for personal injuries in the absence of immuni-
ties imposed by statute. The Cooper Court did not resolve how contribution was to be
computed, stating: "[W]e have no occasion in this case to determine whether contri-
bution in cases such as this should be based on an equal division of damages or should
be relatively apportioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the parties." 417
U.S. at 108 n.3
After the Supreme Court's decision in Reliable Transfer, the Third Circuit held
that there was no reason why the proportional fault rule should not apply in non-
collision maritime cases involving joint tortfeasor contribution. Griffith v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 785 (1976).
In an action arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-05 (1970), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 902-48a (Supp V. 1975),
the Fourth Circuit in Edmonds v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 558 F.2d 186
(4th Cir. 1977) held that both Cooper and Reliable indicate that "a judgment against
a vessel by a longshoreman. . . where both the vessel and the stevedore are negligent,
should be limited to a sum equal to that part of the whole measured by its own fault
. . . plus any valid lien the stevedore may have on the recovery by the longshoreman,
but of course not to exceed the whole amount of the possible award against the ves-
sel ... " Id. at 193-94.
Another court has applied the Reliable Transfer rule in a non-collision case where
an action was filed for loss arising out of a fire against a marine contractor who
furnished the ship with defective equipment. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 402 F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
0 421 U.S. at 411. Accord, Art. 4, Brussels Convention on Collision Liability of
1910. See note 5 supra. One commentator has considered the possibility that this
provision allowing equally divided damages in the Reliable Transfer rule might become
a loophole to the mandatory application of the rule. Goschka, supra note 2, at 71.
However, the proviso is merely a necessary corollary to the proportional fault rule, and
application of the comparative measure in American admiralty courts should be no
different than that of the signatories of the Brussels Convention. Id. Moreover, the
construction of the loophole by the Court in the proportional fault rule would be
unlikely since the language of Reliable Transfer clearly indicates that damages are to
be equally divided if and only if the degrees of fault cannot be measured. 421 U.S. at
411. The mandatory language does not preclude equal division of damages where the
fault actually is equal between the parties. See Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge,
396 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. La. 1975). In addition, the rule of comparative negligence may
have no application where one vessel's sole fault requires the negligent vessel to bear
the whole loss for both vessels. See Toney v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 307, 312 (M.D.
La. 1975).
"' See, e.g., California v. The Italian M.S. Ilice, 534 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Ninth Circuit would not assume that trial court had literally meant fault was equal
in its pre-Reliable Transfer findings; case remanded with directions to determine com-
parative fault).
'12 See note 100 supra.
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In the Reliable Transfer case, respondent argued that the divided
damages rule should be retained because the proportional fault rule
would cause extreme difficulty in assigning relative degrees of fault."'
Notwithstanding that argument, the Court adopted the proportional
fault rule and acknowledged that those countries that have adopted
the proportional fault rule of the Brussels Convention have had no
particular problems of application. The Court further noted that "in
our own admiralty law a rule of comparative negligence has long been
applied with no untoward difficulties in personal injury actions.""'
However, the Reliable Transfer Court did provide for the possibility
that the fault of all parties may not be distinguishable."5 In such
cases, damages are divided equally."6
The Reliable Transfer Court would not concede that the propor-
tional fault rule would cause extreme difficulty in assigning relative
degrees of fault, presumably because negligence principles provide for
proper apportionment. Since fault can be distinguished from causa-
tion in a limited number of collision cases,"7 courts must acknowl-
edge that the process of assigning relative degrees of fault does not
involve allocation of the factors of physical causation."' Instead,
courts must assign comparative degrees of fault as the term has been
traditionally understood in maritime law."I9 Nevertheless, one party's
"I Brief for Respondent at 16-17, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397 (1975).
"1 421 U.S. at 407. The Reliable Transfer Court stated that "[plotential prob-
lems of proof in some cases hardly require adherence to an archaic and unfair rule in
all cases." Id. Nevertheless, the Court did not concede that serious problems of appli-
cation would result: "Every other major maritime nation has evidently been able to
apply a rule of comparative negligence without serious problems .. " Id., citing
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 346 (1932).
"1 421 U.S. at 411. Where fault is genuinely equal on the part of each vessel, e.g.,
Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 396 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. La. 1975), or where both
parties are at fault but their respective degrees of fault cannot be distinguished, total
damages are to be divided equally between the vessels. 421 U.S. at 411. Where fault
cannot be ascertained on the part of either vessel, each vessel presumably will bear
its own damages. See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra. A vessel solely at fault
still bears all of the damages-of both vessels. E.g., Harris v. Newman, 404 F. Supp.
947 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
' Id. See note 3 supra.
,, See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at §§ 7-2 through § 7-5.
W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 533 n.11 (3d ed. 1971);
V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 276 (1974). See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v.
Marine Constr. & Design Co., 402 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (W.D. Wash 1975)
("Culpability, not causation, is the standard by which damages are assessed in com-
parative negligence cases.") See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. 0/S East Point, 421 F.
Supp. 48, 52 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
' See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at §§ 7-2, 7-3.
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fault is not subject to apportionment unless it in part caused the
damage. 20 Courts apparently have recognized that, upon evaluating
relative fault in collisions, damages should not be assessed by com-
paring the number of individual acts, omissions or violations commit-
ted by each party. 2' Rather, the consequential seriousness of each
party's fault should be weighed. In comparing degrees of fault, how-
ever, courts must measure not moral blameworthiness, but negli-
gence.
2
In applying the rule of Reliable Transfer, judges continue to act
as triers of both fact and law, 123 exercising the discretion and judg-
ment demanded by their office. 24 Furthermore, both the divided
damages rule and the proportional fault rule demand the same inves-
tigation and evaluation of evidence. 25 Thus, the focus of admiralty
"I The court cannot take into consideration fault which have not contributed to
the collision. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 275 (1974). English cases
applying the proportional fault rule are in substantial agreement. See, e.g., The Peter
Benoit, 84 L.J.P. 87, 31 Times L.R. 277 (1915), (Pickford & Bankes, L.JJ); The Kara-
mea, 9 Lloyd's List L.R. 375, 376 (1921).
In Toney v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. La. 1975), the court concluded
that because the defendants committed no acts of negligence that in any way contrib-
uted to the collision, the rule of comparative fault was inapplicable. Nevertheless, the
defendants had been technically at "fault" for violating statutes requiring anchor
lights and a bell for fog. Id. at 311. In addition, the court found that even if the
defendants' barge had been anchored in an unsafe position, the improper anchorage
played no part in the collision. Id. at 312.
121 See, e.g., Linehan v. United States Lines, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 678 (D. Del. 1976)
(vessel at less fault had actually violated more regulations).
22 V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 276 (1974). Dean Schwartz points out
in an example that a drunken party to a collision ought not to be condemned solely
upon moral criteria, but that his actions should be assessed by legal standards of
negligence. Id.
'2 Historically, English courts followed the civil law to which maritime law is
closely related, thereby establishing the American practice of trying admiralty cases
without a jury. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 1-4.
2I Houston Barge Line, Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, 416 F. Supp. 417, 424
(N.D. Miss. 1976); Franck, Collisions at Sea in Relation to International Maritime
Law, 12 L.Q. REv. 260, 263-64 (1896).
Admiralty courts, however, are not bound by the common law rules of evidence.
The Denny, 127 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1942). Admiralty courts historically have faced
problems of proof resulting from geographic distance from the event. Consequently,
these courts have adopted rules of evidence which are not as restrictive as the common
law rules, especially in relation to the admissibility of documents customarily used in
trade. Stein Hall & Co. v. S.S. Concordia Viking, 494 F.2d 287, 292 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974).
"2 Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. La. 1975). Because
Reliable Transfer was decided subsequent to the trial in Guidry, the parties were given
the opportunity to reopen the case for further evidence, or to file additional briefs
concerning the effect of Relidble Transfer on the litigation. Id. at 953 n.61. Neverthe-
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court examination of collisions will not differ substantially from the
methods of proof employed under the divided damages rule.
Nevertheless, appellate review of trial court apportionment of
fault in post-Reliable Transfer cases might cause some confusion. In
admiralty practice, an appellate court generally accepts the determi-
nations of the district court based on the evidentiary findings of that
court, unless those findings are clearly against the preponderance of
evidence or are clearly erroneous.' 6 Although trial court findings of
fact are not conclusive, a heavy burden rests upon the party who
seeks to overturn them.'1 Consistent with this admiralty practice, the
Seventh Circuit, in Feeder Line Towing Service, Inc. v. Toledo Peoria
& Western Railroad,' and the Second Circuit, in Getty Oil v. S.S.
Ponce de Leon,' have held that the apportionment of the amount
of negligence attributable to each party is subject to the clearly erro-
neous rule. Thus, the mere fact that the appellate court may disagree
less, the parties felt that the presentation of additional evidence was not necessary.
Id.
While English courts have had nautical assessors to assist them in admiralty
cases, expert witnesses may aid American admiralty courts in their examination of
evidence. See Goschka, supra note 2, at 69. Comparative fault proof methods include
the use of many available materials including weather reports, topographical and
hydrographical charts, tide tables, local regulations, vessel descriptions, ship docu-
ments, personnel testimony and much more. See 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 113, 117 (1975),
citing Williams, Conduct of Marine Collision Investigations Involving Naval Vessels
or Property, 20 JAG J. 111 (1966).
" McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954); Glenview Park Dist. v.
Melhus, 540 F.2d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976) (review of trial court finding of no negli-
gence in admiralty wrongful death proceeding); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 784
(5th Cir. 1976) (review of trial court finding of negligence under Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1970)). Norfolk Shipbldg. & Drydock Corp. v. M/Y
LaBelle Simone, 537 F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1976) (review of district court findings
on contract invoices). Respondent in Reliable Transfer assumed that the "clearly
erroneous" rule would apply to apportionment if the proportional fault rule was
adopted by the Court. Brief for Respondent at 17, United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
In Id. A finding is "clearly erroneous" when "although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
'M 539 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1976). In Feeder Line, the Seventh Circuit held that
the scope of review of comparative fault apportionment upon appeal is the same as
that exercised under Rule 52(a), FED. R. Civ. P. In accordance with that rule, the
appellate court may not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless "clearly
erroneous." Id. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS § 96 at 479
(3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WIGHoT].
12- 555 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1977).
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with the allocation of fault will not be sufficient to set it aside unless
it is clearly erroneous.'30
The clearly erroneous standard of review applies only to questions
of fact and not to questions of law. 3' In addition, some courts have
held that the standard is inapplicable to mixed questions of law and
fact. 32 The Supreme Court, however, has held that the test applies
to a finding of negligence in admiralty cases"33 even though a determi-
nation of negligence involves the application of a principle of law to
the facts of the case. 34 While appellate review of apportionment may
cause confusion in American courts, English courts have refused to
deem significant any distinctions among questions of law, fact, or
mixed questions of both, and have permitted appellate courts to re-
vise apportionment only in very exceptional cases.' American courts
similary should restrict appellate review of damage apportionment
and permit revision only where the trial court has made an error of
law or has abused its discretion. 3'
Despite the adoption of the proportional fault rule, American
admiralty law still does not conform to international maritime law
13 Id. at 335. But cf. Complaint of B.F.T. No. Two Corp., 433 F. Supp. 854, 875-
76 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (comparative fault listed as a conclusion of law).
13' WRIGHT, supra note 128, at § 96, 481.
131 E.g., Stafos v. Jarvis, 477 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 944
(1973); University Hills, Inc. v. Patton, 427 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1970).
13 McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954). Two circuits have refused
to apply the "clearly erroneous" test to findings of negligence. See Tucker v. Calmar
S.S. Corp., 457 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1966); Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 774, 776-78 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966). But see In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132, 136
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1971).
' WRIGHT, supra note 128, at § 96, 481.
' See, e.g., The Karamea, 9 Lloyd's List L.R. 375, 376 (1921). In The Karamea,
the House of Lords stated that apportionment is "different in essence from a mere
finding of fact in the ordinary sense. It is a question, not of principle or of positive
findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of
weighing different considerations. It involves an individual choice of discretion, as to
which there may well be differences of opinion by different minds." Id. See 4 R.
MARSDEN, BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, COLSIONS AT SEA 153-54 (11th ed. 1970).
131 The Supreme Court has held that the "clearly erroneous" test should apply
whenever the finding is based upon the "fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289
(1960). If the appellate courts are uniform in their defense of the lower courts' damage
allocation, except in situations of gross abuse of discretion, fewer appeals may be
prosecuted. Goschka, supra note 21, at 69. However, neither a greater number of
appeals nor the existence of more divergence of view is foreseeable under a proportional
fault rule. Huger, supra note 5, at 547-48.
RELIABLE TRANSFER
with regard to recovery by innocent cargo owners.'37 In the United
States, innocent cargo may recover from non-carrying vessels and the
principle of joint and several liability is applied among vessels at
fault. The Harter Act'3 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
'' The suit in Reliable Transfer involved only damage to the vessel, Mary A.
Whalen. 421 U.S. at 398.
In addition to recovery for cargo damage, the towing situation often creates dis-
tinct legal problems in collision cases. See generally A. PARKs, LAW OF TUG, TOW AND
PILOTAGE (1971). Tug and tow are considered together as one unit in the application
of collision rules. See GIFFIN, supra note 1, at 411-12; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note
30, at § 7-14. Courts apply the concept of "dominant mind" to impose sole liability
upon the tug when that vessel is in sole charge of the navigation. Cushing v. John
Fraser, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 184 (1859). The corollary principle is that if the tow is the
dominant mind, the tug is not liable for damages when the tug has obeyed the orders
of the tow and has not negligently executed orders or contributed to a dangerous
situation. E.g., Old Time Molasses Co. v. United States, 31 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1929).
Even when the tug is the dominant mind, the tow may be liable for breach of such
duties as keeping a proper lookout, having sufficient and seaworthy towing equipment,
carrying proper lights, and proper steering. GRIuFFI, supra note 1, at § 182. The refusal
of courts to impute the negligence of the tug to the tow has another important conse-
quence. Where the tow itself is damaged through the fault of the tug and a third vessel,
the tow can recover from them both as joint tortfeasors. The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695
(1876). However, the Reliable Transfer decision may answer the previously disputed
question of how contribution between joint tortfeasors will be computed and whether
contribution should be allowed by equal or proportional division of damages. See note
109 supra.
Rules applying to tug and tow should remain intact after Reliable Transfer. See,
e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Willamette-Western Corp., 519 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th
Cir. 1975). In Crown Zellerbach, a post-Reliable Transfer case, the court fourd both
the tug and barge at fault in a collision with an overhanging power line because
employees on both vessels breached their duty to maintain a lookout for overhead
obstructions. Id. In S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc. 415 F. Supp. 596
(S.D. Fla. 1976), a tug was liable for the collision of an unmanned barge with a bridge
where the barge was under the exclusive custody, care and control of the tug. Id. Two
other recent cases indicate that fault attributable to tug and tow will be apportioned
in accordance with traditional rules and duties. In Barge Poling Bros. No. 23, Inc. v.
Skibs A.S. Namset, 429 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court found that the
plaintiff barge was free of contributory negligence because its duty to ensure that the
proper navigational lights were functioning had been met. Id. at 1320. In Dow Chemi-
cal Co. v. MV Gulf Seas, 428 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. La. 1977), Reliable Transfer was
applicable to a suit by a barge owner against the tug for loss of the barge. The court
held that the barge owner's fault with respect to failing to close ballast pumping system
valves and failing to instruct the tug crew in the operation of the deballasting system
was a contributing cause of the sinking of the barge equal to the tug owner's fault with
respect to the inadequacy of crew members. Id. at 673.
In 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970). Sections 1 and 2 of the Harter Act make it unlawful
for any bill of lading covering a shipment "from or between ports of the United States
and foreign ports" to contain clauses relieving the vessel or her owners from liability
"for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stowage,
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(COGSA)'3 ' provide that if a vessel owner has exercised due diligence
to insure that a vessel is seaworthy, "' he is not liable to the owners
of cargo carried by the vessel for damages caused by negligence or
vessel mismanagement."' Courts have construed these statutes, how-
ever, to allow full recovery by innocent cargo owners from the non-
carrying vessel in mutual fault collisions; "2 the seaworthy carrier be-
comes subject to contribution to the non-carrying vessel since the
colliding vessels are treated as joint tortfeasors."3
Thus, American principles of joint and several liability permit full
recovery by cargo owners from the non-carrier if the carrier is insol-
vent or statutorily exempt from direct liability.' 4 The non-carrier's
recourse after payment to cargo owners in collision cases is to recover
one-half of the cargo damages paid by means of contribution from the
carrier.4 5 After Reliable Transfer, the non-carrier should be allowed
custody, care, or proper delivery" of the cargo, or weakening or lessening the obligation
"to properly equip, man, provision and outfit said vessel, and to make said vessel
seaworthy .. " Id. at §§ 190-191.
'' 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970). COGSA, id., enacted by Congress in 1936, adopts
essentially the same provisions of the Harter Act that relieve the carrier from liability
to its cargo for the navigational errors of the carrying ship. COGSA also preserves the
duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the ship or carrier prior to the time the goods
are loaded. See A. KNAUTH, OcEAN Bis OF LADING 168-69 (4th rev. ed. 1953). See
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 30, at § 3-28. See also United States v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
"I The duty to use due diligence to make a ship seaworthy is a comprehensive
duty which includes proper manning, equipping, supplying, and fitness to receive and
care for the cargo. Section 2 of the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 191 (1970), prohibits
contracting out of this duty. Seaworthiness requires that the vessel not only be struc-
turally sound, but also that it be properly equipped and manned. See The Southwark,
191 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1903).
' E.g., The Alabama & The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875).
:2 E.g., The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1893).
3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 616, 622 (1975).
'" E.g., The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899). Shipowners have argued that
cargo recovery from non-carriers is contrary to the purpose and intent of the Harter
Act and COGSA. See Note, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure
of the Brussels Convention to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability,
Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 881-82 (1957). In addition, supporters of
ratification of the Brussels Convention argued that the rule frustrated congressional
intent. Id. at 890 n.64. However, cargo interests, most notable among supporters of
equal division of damages, persuaded Congress not to ratify the Convention. See gener-
ally Hearings on S. 555, S. 556 Before the Senate Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961-62). See
also Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases,
45 CALIF. L. Rv. 304 (1957).
"I E.g., The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899). The non-carrying vessel, as a
joint tortfeasor, is liable for full recovery to the cargo owners. However, the non-
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to demand comparative contribution from carriers according to a
determination of proportional fault.'46 Both the present practice of
contribution and the suggested comparative contribution formula
differ from international practice under the Brussels Convention
which allows cargo recovery from the non-carrier only to the extent
of that vessel's degree of fault.' 7 In addition, no principle of joint and
several liability is involved and the non-carrier cannot receive contri-
bution from the carrier. Innocent cargo may receive full recovery
under the Brussels Convention rule only by recovering from each
tortfeasor according to their respective degrees of fault."'
Reliable Transfer did not involve an issue of cargo recovery, thus
leaving unaffected the right of cargo to full recovery from non-
carriers."' Furthermore, the Reliable Transfer Court did not show
any inclination to -adopt other rules in the Brussels Convention that
may conflict with present American admiralty law.'5 0 Arguably, the
Brussels Convention treatment of innocent cargo conflicts with the
basic American legal principle that an innocent cargo owner should
not be penalized by denying him full recovery where the cargo is
damaged or destroyed by a non-carrying vessel.'5 ' By limiting the
innocent cargo recovery to the non-carrying vessel's degree of fault,
innocent cargo may not receive full recovery.'52 In addition, the non-
carrying vessel may then include the payment of cargo as an item of damages to be
divided with the carrier. Id.
I,' The Reliable Transfer decision may have changed the rule of The
Chattahoochee. While the owner of cargo will still be entitled to full recovery against
the non-carrying vessel, the non-carrying vessel may no longer recoup an arbitrary 50%
of the payment from the carrying vessel. Instead, the non-carrying vessel will receive
contribution in proportion to the carrying vessel owner's degree of fault. Healy &
Koster, Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States; Proportional Fault Rule, 7 J. MArr.
L. & CoM. 293, 298 (1975). See 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 616, 623 (1975). In the latter article,
the author suggests that Reliable Transfer be applied to cases involving contribution:
in a collision where cargo laden Vessel A and non-carrying vessel B are 75% and 25%
at fault, respectively, the cargo would collect the full measure of damages from Vessel
B. Vessel B would then collect 75% of these damages as contribution from A. Id. at
623 n.43. However, this suggestion provides little advantage where the carrying vessel
is a total loss and its owner has limited his liability to the value of the vessel, id. at
625 n.56, pursuant to the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-
96 (1970).
"I Reprinted in English, 6 KNAu'H's BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 39 (7th ed. A Krauth
& C. Krauth 1969).
"' See Goschka, supra note 2, at 68.
' See note 134 supra.
' See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 n.17 (1975).
See generally Donovan & Ray, Mutual Fault-Half Damages Rule: A Critical
Analysis, 41 INs. CouN. J. 395 (1974).
,12 Cargo owners contend that implementation of the Brussels Convention rule for
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carrying vessel should bear the burden of obtaining contribution from
the other negligent party to the collision rather than requiring inno-
cent cargo to seek recovery from each tortfeasor.5 3 Thus, the weight
of precedent'54 and apparent policy55 present forceful arguments for
the retention of joint and several liability.
The abrogation of the divided damages rule by the Supreme Court
in Reliable Transfer was a long awaited change. While the propor-
tional fault rule is consistent with the practice of virtually every other
maritime nation, American policies governing innocent cargo's right
to full recovery from the non-carrying vessel do not conform to inter-
national principles.' However, the proportional fault rule might pre-
cipitate comparative contribution between vessels in collision cases
involving cargo recovery 51 and in non-collision cases involving joint
tortfeasor contribution.'
Application of the proportional fault rule now eliminates the ne-
cessity of the Pennsylvania, major-minor fault, and error in extremis
rules which had developed in a divided damages context. 9 Neverthe-
less, these rules still may be employed as evidentiary inferences with
respect to the preliminary question of whether fault on the part of a
vessel contributed causally to the collision, and to the determination
of proper degrees of apportionment. In contrast, the principles of
inscrutable fault and inevitable accident remain viable alternatives
to the proportional fault rule.' Because application of these two
principles is predicated on the absence of attributable fault, denying
any award or division of damages is not inconsistent with Reliable
Transfer. In comparing degrees of fault, courts must rely upon tradi-
cargo recovery would increase their insurance premiums. Arguably, cargo owners' in-
surance premiums might increase to compensate the underwriter for his losses where
reduced cargo recoveries are caused by the Convention recovery rule, see text accompa-
nying notes 144-45 supra, and carrying vessel compliance with the Harter Act, see
notes 135-36 supra. Comment, Comparative Negligence Sails in the High Seas: Have
the Recovery Rights of Cargo Owners Been Jeopardized?, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 179,
196 (1977). See Huger, supra note 5, at 552.
13 Goschka, supra note 2, at 68.
13 See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394, 403 (1935);
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 418 (1932).
See notes 148-49 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 134-45 supra.
'7 See note 143 supra.
' See note 109 supra.
'g See text accompanying notes 60-89 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 96-104 supra.
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tional principles of comparative negligence, 6 ' thereby ameliorating
any extreme difficulty in assigning relative degrees of fault.'62
JONATHAN W. SAGER
"' See text accompanying notes 117-25 supra.
'2 Id. The proportional fault rule provides for the equal division of damages where
the fault of the parties may not be distinguishable. 421 U.S. at 407.

